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th eory. In res ponse. I a dmitt o a goo d degree of re lat iv is m" (p. 172). With these words. th e
aut ho r. a professo r o f ethi cs a t Creighton Univers it y in Oma ha. Ne bra s ka. prese nts us with
a su cc in ct rcv iew of his anal ys is of ethi ca l th eo ry as applied to pr o blem a reas of m edical
ethi cs . ba s in g h is ethical an a lysis up o n a sy nthes is of th e th o ug ht o f th e Englis h e m o to vists
and th e large ly subj ect ive Ka nti a n id ea l of pe rso na l auto nom y. Dougherty s tresses
in s tru cti o n o f va lu es as th e ba sis o f m o ra lit y a nd sta tes th at ethi cs s hould refin e and clarify
mora l in stru cti o ns.
When discussing medica l researc h. Dougherty ex p resses s h ock and horror at the human
research protoco ls carried o ut by the Naz i medi ca l expe rim e nters (p . 143) . After d esc ribing
so m e o f the horrors perp etrat ed durin g th e seco nd World War. Dou g he rt y ri g htl y point s
out that th e ideo logv w hich allowed s uch experimen ts deve lo ped well before the seco nd
World War. But. ir o nica lly. w he n assigning ca uses fo r the Naz is' abuse of human right s.
Doughert y fail s to li st the ty pe o f re lat iv isti c ethica l theory w hi c h he es p o uses.
Th e best pa rt of th e book is a stud y of th e e thica l and lega l res pons ib ili ties of hos pitals.
Most of the signifi cant lega l d ec ision s in rega rd to hospi tal care are prese nt ed and a ve ry
c lear li st of patient rig ht s an d ho spi tal duti es is afforded. In thi s secti o n especia lly.
D o ug he rt y di s p lays a co mpre he ns ive view of th e va lu es and act ion s which wo uld im pro ve
in st itutional health ca re.

-Rev. Kevin O' Rourke. O.P.
Director
Center for Health Care Ethics
SI. I.ouis University Medical Center

Ethicsfrom a TheocentricPerspective, Vol.}
Theology and Ethics
by James M. Gustafson
Chicago: Ulli" ersill' o( Chicago Press, 1983. 345 PI'- $ 10.95.

Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, Vol. 2
Ethics and Theology
by James M. Gustafson
Chicago: Unilwsill' o( Chicago Press. 1984. 3261'1'- $25.
Th ese two works complement each other. The first devel o ps a theocentric pe rs pecti ve;
the second sets out to exp lore the qu es tion. What diffe rence does a theocentric pe rsp ecti ve
make to the interpret a tion of moralit y" Together they constitute an intriguing and thoughtprovo king study . While th e work of an y Christian et hici st or moral th eo logian pres upposes
ce rtain theological position s. it is rare to find th ese e lab orated systematically and at length.
A serious reader is compelled to grapp le w ith man y of the mos t basic religiou s issues and
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cannot avoid the challenge to articulate her o r his own theological stan ce . Whil e
Gustafson's position s ha ve provoked criticism and express ions of disagreement , th ey force
one to respond.
The key themes of the first work are the nature of God and th e direction of H is purposes;
man and the cosmos; religion. The author deve lops hi s case by challenging what he takes to
be some assumptions which have beco me embedded in our culture. Man has beco me th e
measure in religion , theology and ethics. Religion and God have bee n put in the se rvice of
human needs (p. 83). Gustafson sets o ut to reverse this assumption a nd. in so doing,
develops a number of distinctive th eses: God's purposes do not necessa ril y co incid e with the
human project seek ing welfare and happines s; the cosmos does not exist for man and for
the furthering of hi s purposes; man is not the moral measure of all things (p. 91); it is
questionable whether there is a special pro vide nce over the course of human affairs which
assures that things turn out for human betterment , ifnot imm ed iately. then in the long run ,
and if not in human histo ry, then in afterlife .
Does Gu stafso n mean that th ere is a rad ical dich o tomy between human fulfillment a nd
the purposes of God? This is what he seems to assert in the ea rlier pa rt of the book. If thi s
were the case, and if God's purposes a re the ultimate measure of moralit y, then mora lit y
could be in contradiction to the human fulfi llm ent. The achievement of God's purposes
could require the nega tion of the human good. Later·he reasserts the view that " ... rheas is
not the guarantor of human benefits" (p. 112). Howeve r. he later a ffirm s gro und s for
confidence in God's benevo lence towards man. But thi s benevolence, he a rgues. does not
support the assumption that " . .. God's purposes are the fulfillment of my own best interests
as I conceive them" (p. 202). The dichotom y, then, is not between the divine purposes and
genu in e human welfare, but rather between the divine purpose and what an individual may
(falsely) judge to be hi s or her interests. Th is is a much less radical view than the earlier
chapters suggest. It would imply that God's purposes and my own genuine best interests
ma y co incid e. However, it is the stronger interpretation w hich see ms to be more dominant
in Gustafson's thinking.
In the second volume, th e author summari zes his requirements for a comprehensive and
coherent account of theological ethi cs (p . 143). It must developed in relation to four base
points: (a) th e interpretation of God and God's relation to t he world and. in pa rticular, to
human beings and th e interpretation of God's purposes; (b) the interpretation of the
meaning of hum an experience - of hi storical life of the human communit y. of events and
circumstances in which perso ns and collectivities act, an d of nature and man 's particular
participation in it ; (c) the interpretation of pe rso ns a nd co llectivities as moral agents, and of
th eir acts; and (d) the interpretation of how persons and collectivitie ought to make moral
choices and ought to judge moral acts . C hristian ethics is to be tested for adequacy with
reference to four so urces: (a) the Bible and Christian tradition: (b) th eir philosophical
methods and princip les; (c) their use of scient ifi c information and other sources of
knowledge about the world ; and (d) human experience. While these elements would , no
d o ubt , be accepted by most who seek to ex plicate a C hristian ethic it is not completely clear
why some points are given more prominence than others. It is noteworthy that scientific
sources and human expe rience are more significant than the Bible. But if this is to be tested
for adequacy against the Bible, how is it justifiable to subordinate the Bib le in this way?
Some elements of the Biblical account are selected as "backing" (p. 144). These are se lected
on the basis of coherence with conclusions drawn from t he other sources. But is the re not a
danger here that on ly those elements of the Bible wi ll be taken into account which " back"
conclusions a lready drawn from elsewhere?
The central ex perience is "piety. " The New Testament accounts "inform" theocentric
pi ety. The nature of the arguments as a whole seems to be the establishmen t of a kind o f
cognitive equi lib rium , where particular so urces are given weight insofar as th ey cohere with
and support other so urces . The starting point is, th en. a particular form of religious
consciousness which grasps the patterns of interdepe nd ence in the world , including nature
as signs of the divine power and ordering.
The approach is then illustrated and concretized in a detailed discussion of four topics :
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marriage and the fami ly; suicide; population and nutrition ; and biomedical research
funding. Th ese discussions are finely constructed expos iti ons within the com plex
framework described. Some features call for special mention. The elements which eme rge
as normative are responsibility, attitudes a nd dispositions rather than rules or laws (p. 165).
Sometimes thi s leads to a certain vagueness. For exa mple, accountability does not warrant
coercive or intrusive methods to obtain genetic profiles. But it is not clearly exp lained why
not (p. 165). Later it is argued th a t theocentric ethics backs a preference for vo lu ntary
restraints (p . 247). If human self-d etermination is an aspect of well-being, however, and if
the ultimately normative divine purposes do not coincide with human well-being, why is
self-determination so significant?
The d iscuss ion of suicide manifest s a profound, sy mpathetic understanding of the tragic
circumstances which may surround th e act. Two points may be mentioned. The strong
se nse of the bonds aris ing from the "wholes" or commun ities to which we belong is brought
to bear on this qu estion. Thus, where a person has some prospect of functioning in
community, interve ntion to preve nt such a one from committing suicide wou ld be
warranted. But it is in the discussio n of exceptions that the theological focus beco mes
clearest. Gustafson argues that there are justifiable suicides (p. 215). In the first volume, he
had argued that God does not guarantee hum a n welfare. Here he argues that there ca n be
concrete circumstances of hopeles s afniction where this lack of guarantee becomes the
dominant rea lity. I n such cases , " ... there is reason for enmity toward God" (p. 216). This
seems to spe ll out the implications of the fundamental position taken , namel y that God's
purpose s do not necessarily coincide with hum a n welfare. Does this mean that where this
non-coincidence is concrete ly experienced, one ma y be justified in a "quarre l" with God?
There see ms to be more than a rejection of faci le theodicies here . There is also a degree of
confusion. If one li ves within the theocentric ethic described by G ustafson, one would
accep t that God's purposes do not necessarily co incid e with o ne's human welfare. If one's
circumstances are such that one's human welfare cannot be reali zed in any real sense. it
would see m to follow that one shou ld simply submit. For is it not to be expected that
sometimes th e divergence between perso nal human we lfare and the wider purposes of God
will become a matter of experience? Would it not the n follow that one should submit to
what ever ma y be these wider. but unknown purpos es? That is. should one not accept one's
apparently meaningless suffering in the assurance that this somehow se rves those wider
purposes of God? The only reaso n which could justify a quarrel with God would surely be
that one hold s. contrary to what has bee n argued in these works. that God's purposes ought
to coincide with human we lfare.
Another fundamental feature of the approach. namely. the discernment of
responsibi liti es with reference to th e "w holes" of whic h we are a pa ft. is particularly clear in
the treatment of population and nutrition (p. 247). For Gustafson. the "whole" of current
humanit y and future generations is morally relevent. and common good of that whole
s hapes moral judgments. e.g .. concerning artificial contracept ion (p. 229). The latter may
be justified for the sake of this common good. Gustafson does not accept the Roman
Catholic "method" of sexual abstinence beca use it runs counter to deep biologica l drives
and can be detrimental to the interperso nal values of love and companionship (p. 246). But.
I would suggest. such an argum e nt seems to g ive human "well-being" a salience which . in
Gustafson's view of things . it does not necessa rily have.
In th e finely wrought discussion of biomedical research funding. th e probl em of th e
appropriate relation between th e indi v idual person and the morally relevant whole of
which she or he is a part has particular significa nce. Within Gustafso n's perspective. that
approach which focuses almost exclusively on autonomy. informed consent. etc .. is
shortsighted (p. 276). This may very well be the case. But if we move to Gustafson's view
that the individual persons are not of abso lut e value (p. 275). does this mean that the value
of the indi vidual is relative to one or a ll of the wholes? Gustafson's care in considering
multiple considerations would check any crass instrumentali zing of th e individual for the
sake of the whole. But is not the danger of such instrumentali zing embedded in the basic
presuppositions')

88

Linacre Quarterly

.j

I.

I have focused on two points: (I) th e theological thesis that the di vine purposes do not
coincide with hum an well-being, and (2) the st ru ctures of moral relevance according to
which moral significance is to be deter min ed by references to the mUltipl e "wholes" of
which we are a part. I have suggested that these give rise to certain tensio ns. Neve rth eless.
the vol u mes remain a profound contrib ution to theological and et hical reflection. Any
subsequent work, to be taken seriously. will have to meet the exact ing standards which they
have set.
-Brian V. Johnstone, C.SS.R .
The Cat holic University of A merica

What Are They Saying About
Genetic Engineering?
by Thomas A. Shannon
Nell' York. PaL/lisl Press. 1985. vi+ 103 pages. $4.95.

This is quite a good littl e introduction to some of th e et hi ca l issues associated with the
field of genet ics. In a remarkably brief space of less than 100 pages. the au th or covers a
variety of fie ld s of contemporary investigation and highlights their et hical compone nt s. He
begins wi th three chapters th at deal with the re lationsh ips between science (and scientists)
and society. the control of potentially harmfu l knowledge. and the nature of human
personhood and responsibilities to th e future . Then the aut hor moves to a discussion of th e
a ttempt to understand human nature through genetics (sociobio logy); the use of
reco mbinant DNA technology; techniques for ass isting human concept io n and birth
(sperm banks , am ni ocentes is, in vitro fer tiliza t ion. emb ryo tra~sfer. sex selection.
surrogate motherhood. the fetus as an independent pat ien t o f medica l trea tment) ; ge ne
transfer as therapy for ge netic disease; induced modifica ti o ns of plant and an imal species;
and economic issues pertaining to t he fu nding of and access to the new thera pies and
technologies. The author constructs his discussion by citing prominent aut ho rities in the
fie ld : Paul Ramsey. Daniel Callahan. Leon Kass. Karl Rahner. Ric ha rd McCormick.
Josep h Fletcher. Jeremy Rifkin. th e Natio nal Conference of Cath ol ic Bishops.
This book does not atte mpt to break new ground. and wou ld be of little use to someo ne
a lready familiar with the field. But for the reader who is interested in gainingan overview of
the ethical dimensions of current genetic theory and technology, the work will serve the
purpose admirably. The author's general position is midd le-of-the road. cautiou s. He is
more concerned to ach ieve a balanced position by noting the strengths of the various views
than to critici7.e any of them in a systemat ic fas hi o n. Althou g h the scho lar wou ld be
unlikely to profit from a rea din g of this work. it cou ld be very helpful as a text for an
introductory course in bioethics.
-Gary M. Atkinson
SI. Thomas College
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